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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(k), Utah Code Ann- (1993), and 
pursuant to the Supreme Court's transfer of the appeal pursuant to 
Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly extend full faith and 
credit to that certain judgment made and entered in the Superior 
Court of California, County of Los Angeles, awarding Hansen 
ownership and possession of property located in the town of Alta? 
2. Did the trial court properly conclude that 
enforcement of the California judgment is not stayed during the 
pendency of an appeal of the judgment due to Fiirmanski's failure 
to file a bond or undertaking with the California court? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
invoking specific performance under Ru.le 70 of the Utah Rules of: 
Civil Procedure and vesting title to the Alta, Utah property in 
Hansen? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. In reviewing an order granting summary judgment 
(i s sues • i.j above), the Court " view[ s ] t h e f a c t s an «• 1 
inferei- *^- : . . •"-:<•• - •? to I. he losLny party/" arvJ 
reviews the district court's legal conclusions for correctness. 
Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 
1991). The Coin: t: wiJ 1 affirm summary judgment i f there are no 
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genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co., 676 
P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). 
2. The Court reviews the trial court's order invoking 
specific performance under Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (issue 3 above) under an abuse of discretion standard. 
"Specific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed to 
sense of justice and good conscience of court, and, accordingly, 
considerable latitude of discretion is allowed in court's 
determination as to whether it shall be granted and what judgment 
should be entered in respect thereto..." Morris v. Svkes. 624 
P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981). Trial judge is granted broad 
discretion in applying and formulating specific performance 
remedy. Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979); LHIW, 
Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On August 31, 1989, the Superior Court of California, 
County of Los Angeles (the "California Court"), entered a "Further 
Judgment on Reserved Issues" (the "Judgment") in a case captioned 
Marriage of Petitioner: Stanley Furmanski and Respondent: Gail 
H. Furmanski: Case No. 0128 811 (the "California Action"). The 
Judgment, in part, constitutes a division of property in 
connection with the dissolution of the marriage between appellee, 
Gail C. Hansen ("Hansen") and appellant Stanley Furmanski 
("Furmanski"). Pursuant to the Judgment, Hansen was awarded 
f ?\riiTK:\iii7\nn^Q9nn m 2 
certain real property and the improvements thereon (the 
"Property") located in the Town of Alta, State of Utah, 
Despite entry of the Judgment almost four years ago, 
Furmanski has refused to deed the Property to Hansen.1 Furmanski 
filed an appeal from the Judgment with the Court of Appeal of the 
State of California, Second Appellate Division, Division 5. That 
court affirmed the Judgment. Then, Furmanski, petitioned the 
California State Supreme Court to undertake review of the 
Judgment. The California State Supreme Court denied Furmanski's 
petition. While pursuing the appeal process as to the Judgment, 
Furmanski has never filed an undertaking or bond with the 
California court as required under California law to stay 
enforcement of the Judgment. 
furmanski's refusal to deed the Property to Hansen is but 
one example, among many, of Furmanski's ongoing efforts to 
harass and intimidate Hansen and deprive her of her property. 
Familiarity with the background of the California Action is 
helpful to an understanding of the lack of merit of this appeal 
and Furmanski's rationale for filing it. Therefore, this court 
is urged to read in its entirety the opinion of the Court of 
Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, 
Division Five, affirming the Judgment, a copy of which opinion 
is included in the Addendum to this brief, with a certified copy 
found at Pages 265-297 of the Record. The opinion of the 
California Court of Appeal is most instructive as to Furmanski's 
obstructive tactics, his misuse of the judicial system and his 
personal war against Hansen. As stated in Footnote 1 of the 
opinion of the California Court of Appeal, "[a] personal wage 
was also waged by Furmanski and Ibara [Furmanski's paramour and 
subsequent wife] against Hansen. For example, Ibara paid 
$25,000 to have Hansen killed, a plot of which Furmanski was 
aware and approved. Ibara eventually pled guilty to 
solicitation to commit murder. After serving one year in 
prison, Ibara was released and subsequently married Furmanski. 
During this time, Furmanski was also arrested for burglary of 
Hansen's home." 
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Since enforcement of the Judgment was not stayed, Hansen 
filed an action with the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah (the "Utah Court Action") for the sole 
purpose of enforcing the Judgment as to the Property. During the 
pendency of the Utah Court Action, Furmanski exhausted the appeal 
process of the Judgment in the California courts, and, he then 
petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for review of 
the Judgment. Furmanski's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
presently pending before the Supreme Court. Throughout the appeal 
process, Furmanski has taken the position that he is not required 
to file a bond or undertaking to stay enforcement of the Judgment 
so long as an appeal of the Judgment is pending. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings 
On May 3, 1993, the district court entered an order 
granting Hansen summary judgment, according the Judgment full 
faith and credit in the State of Utah and divesting Furmanski and 
his alter ego, Stan Furmanski, M.D., Inc., as to title to the 
Property and vesting title in Hansen. (R. 644-646.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Hansen is an individual residing in the State of 
California who claims an ownership interest in the Property. 
(R. 306.) 
2. Title to the Property is presently vested in Stan 
Furmanski, M.D., Inc. ("Furmanski Corp."). (R. 492.) 
3. On August 31, 1989, the Judgment was entered in the 
California Action. (R. 7.) Pursuant to the Judgment, the marital 
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estate of Hansen and Furinanski was distributed and the Property 
was awarded to Hansen. (R. 16.) 
4. Furmanski Corp. is an alter ego of Furmanski. 
(R. 17.) 
5. Furmanski Corp. is not represented in the Utah 
Court Action by a licensed attorney. (R. 667-668.) 
6. Furmanski has never filed a bond or undertaking to 
stay enforcement of the Judgment. (R. 674.) 
7. The Judgment which awards the Property to Hansen 
has not been vacated, modified or set aside. (R. 307.) Furmanski 
filed an appeal from the Judgment, but such appeal was denied, and 
the Judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeal of the State of 
California, Second Appellate Division, Division Five. (R. 265-
297). The Supreme Court of the State of California denied 
Furmanski's petition for review. (R. 298.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although Furmanski sets forth nine separate issues for 
review, the issues are largely redundant of one another and can be 
resolved by consideration of the three issues summarized below. 
(a) Furmanski argues that the Utah trial court cannot 
extend full faith and credit to the Judgment because the 
California court lacked jurisdiction over Furmanski Corp. 
(Furmanski's Issues F and I). As will be shown below, the trial 
court properly rejected Furmanski's argument and extended full 
faith and credit to the Judgment because such argument belonged to 
Furmanski Corp., not Furmanski, and could not be argued by 
f .\Hme\ni7\nnQnorif\ ni c 
Furmanski pro se. Moreover, even if the jurisdictional claim had 
been properly argued in the trial court, on behalf of Furmanski 
Corp., the claim was properly rejected since the California Court 
specifically reserved jurisdiction over Furmanski Corp. as an 
alter ego of Furmanski. 
(b) Furmanski also contends that the trial court erred 
in interpreting California law to require that he file an 
undertaking in order to stay enforcement of the Judgment 
(Furmanski's Issues A, B, C, C-2, G, H and I). As shown below, 
the California Code of Civil Procedure clearly requires an 
undertaking be given to stay enforcement of a judgment directing 
disposition of real property. Therefore, the trial court did not 
err in its interpretation that the Judgment was not stayed. 
(c) Finally, Furmanski contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion by divesting the title of Furmanski and 
Furmanski Corp. in the Property under Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (Furmanski's Issue E). Furmanski claims that 
relief under Rule 70 was first requested orally in the hearing on 
Hansen's motion for summary judgment, and that he was deprived of 
the opportunity to prepare opposition to such relief. We will 
show that Furmanski and Furmanski Corp. had adequate notice as to 
Hansen's request for Rule 70 relief and that such relief was 
properly granted. 
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As set forth more fully below, the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed.2 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXTENDED FULL FAITH AND 
CREDIT TO THE JUDGMENT. 
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution 
obligates the trial court to give "full faith and credit" to the 
Judgment. Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. United 
Resources, Inc., 471 P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1970); Fullenwider Co. v. 
Patterson, 611 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1980). While it is true that 
extension of full faith and credit to a sister state judgment is 
not required where the jurisdiction of the sister state court or 
the regularity of its procedures which constitute due process of 
law are defective, to the extent such jurisdictional and due 
process issues are raised and decided in the sister state action, 
the sister state judgment is conclusive as to those issues as 
well. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 99 (Utah 1986); Fullenwider 
Co. v. Patterson, 611 P.2d at 389. In Ful lenwider Co. v. 
Patterson, where the defendant was collaterally attacking a 
foreign judgment, the court stated: M[I]f the same issue as to 
the jurisdiction of the foreign court was raised and adjudicated 
2As to Furmanski's Issue D, the trial court did not err by 
failing to afford Furmanski a jury trial. Despite Furmanskirs 
assertion, a review of the Record of the Utah Court Action 
indicates he never made demand for trial by jury and never paid 
the statutory jury fee. Moreover, enforcement of the Judgment 
in Utah presents no triable issues of fact for decision by a 
jury. The defenses to enforcement of the Judgment pursued by 
Furmanski constitute legal arguments not factual disputes. See 
R. 681. 
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therein, then the determination of that issue becomes res 
judicata, and is entitled to full faith and credit, the same as 
any other issue that has been so determined." .Id. at 389. 
A review of the Decision (the "Decision") of the Court 
of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate Division, 
Division 5, makes clear that Furmanski raised jurisdictional and 
due process defenses in the California action and in his appeal of 
the Judgment, and that such defenses were deemed meritless.3 In 
Footnote 10 of the Decision, at page 17, (R. 281), the California 
Court of Appeals states as follows: 
10/ Appellants make a number of other 
contentions, all based upon the assumption 
[that] the trial court lacked the 
jurisdiction to act. Inasmuch as the court 
had jurisdiction to act, these contentions 
obviously are without merit. Thus, 
appellants were not denied due process, the 
trial court's judgment is enforceable, the 
trial court's judgment has res judicata 
effect and is entitled to full faith and 
credit and the judgment is not void. 
Appellants also contend, citing Northern 
Pipeline Const, v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 
(1982) 458 U.S. 50 [102 S.Ct. 2858], the 
bankruptcy judge, as a non-article III judge, 
was foreclosed from ruling on California 
state issues, and thus, he could not make 
determinations regarding the division of 
community property. Since the orders 
discussed above deal with federal 
jurisdiction this argument has no relevancy. 
Jurisdictional issues related to the authority of a non-
Article III judge to adjudicate state law issues were raised by 
Furmanski in the California Action and in his appeal of the 
Judgment. The California Court of Appeals held such issues to 
be irrelevant and meritless. Nevertheless, Furmanski persists 
in asserting these issues in an effort to prevent extension of 
full faith and credit to the Judgment, as evidenced by Issues C, 
D and G in his brief. 
f:\dms\147\0039200.01 8 
We also note that appellants' discussion on 
this issue fails to discuss the federal 
legislative events after Northern Pipeline. 
Having failed to convince the California courts that the Judgment 
was jurisdictionally defective, Furmanski asserts a new 
jurisdictional issue in the Utah Court Action in order to thwart 
extension of full faith and credit to the Judgment. Furmanski 
argues that since Furmanski Corp. was not named and served in the 
California Action, the California Court had no authority to order 
a divestiture of the corporation's interest in property.4 
As he did before the trial court, Furmanski, who is not 
a licensed attorney, makes this argument on behalf of Furmanski 
Corp. As stated in Tracy-Burke v. Department of Employment 
Security, 699 P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1985), H[i]t has long been the 
law of this jurisdiction that a corporate litigant must be 
represented in court by a licensed attorney." The reasoning 
behind the rule was explained in Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's 
Association, 350 P.2d 616 (Utah 1960) where the court quoted with 
approval the following language of Paradise v. Nowlin, 195 P. 2d 
867 (Cal. App. 1948): 
A composite of the rule in the decided cases, 
overwhelmingly sustained by the authorities, 
may be thus stated: A natural person may 
represent himself and present his own case to 
the court although he is not a licensed 
attorney. A corporation is not a natural 
person. It is an artificial entity created 
by law and as such it can neither practice 
law nor appear or act in person. Out of 
court it must act in its affairs through its 
agents and representatives and in matters in 
ASee Issues F and I in Furmanski's brief. 
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court it can act only through licensed 
attorneys. A corporation cannot appear in 
court by an officer who is not an attorney 
and it cannot appear in propria persona. 
[Citations omitted.] 
The argument that the California court lacked 
jurisdiction over Furmanski Corp. is an argument belonging to the 
corporate entity not to Furmanski personally.5 Therefore, since 
the corporate entity is not represented by a licensed attorney, 
the jurisdictional argument, as well as this appeal, to the extent 
it is prosecuted on behalf of Furmanski Corp., must be 
disregarded. 
As an aside, however, even if Furmanski Corp.'s 
jurisdictional argument was lawfully presented, the argument would 
be meritless since Paragraph 10 on page 11 of the Judgment (R. 
17.) decrees that Furmanski Corp. is an alter ego of Furmanski, 
and that the California court reserves jurisdiction over such 
entity. Since Furmanski Corp. was deemed an alter ego of 
Furmanski, it was not necessary that Furmanski Corp. be named or 
served in the California action. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED CALIFORNIA 
LAW AS REQUIRING THE FILING OF AN UNDERTAKING TO 
STAY ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT. 
Furmanski admitted to the trial court that he has not 
filed an undertaking to stay enforcement of the Judgment during 
5The trial court at the hearing on Hansen's motion for 
summary judgment repeatedly warned Furmanski that it was a 
violation of Utah law for him to come before a Utah court and 
represent a corporation. (See R. 672-673.) Despite the trial 
court's warnings, Furmanski persists in making arguments on 
behalf of his corporation throughout his brief. 
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the pendency of his appeal. (R. 674.) He claims that Section 916 
of the California Code of Civil Procedure operates to 
automatically stay enforcement of the Judgment during the pendency 
of his appeal. Section 916 states as follows: 
§ 916. Stay of proceedings on perfecting 
appeal; effect. (a) Except as provided in 
Sections 917.1 to 917.9, inclusive, and in 
Section 116.810, the perfecting of an appeal 
stays proceedings in the trial court upon the 
judgment or order appealed from or upon the 
matters embraced therein or affected thereby, 
including enforcement of the judgment or 
order, but the trial court may proceed upon 
any other matter embraced in the action and 
not affected by the judgment or order. 
(emphasis added). 
Cal. Civil Practice Code § 916 (Deering 1993). 
Furmanski in quoting Section 916 in his brief fails to 
include that portion of the section which is underscored above in 
an attempt to mislead this Court as to California law. Section 
917.4, which constitutes an exception to the general rule as to 
stay of proceedings on appeal, states that the perfecting of an 
appeal does not stay enforcement of a judgment directing 
disposition of real property unless an undertaking is given by the 
party who is appealing the judgment. Section 917.4 is stated in 
pertinent part as follows: 
§ 917.4. Undertaking to stay enforcement of; 
judgment or order directing disposition of 
real property pending appeal. The perfecting 
of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of 
the judgment or order in the trial court if 
the judgment or order appealed from directs 
the sale, conveyance or delivery of 
possession of real property which is in the 
possession or control of the appellant or the 
party ordered to sell, convey or deliver 
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possession of the property, unless an 
undertaking in a sum fixed by the trial court 
is given that the appellant or party ordered 
to sell, convey or deliver possession of the 
property will not commit or suffer to be 
committed any waste thereon and that if the 
judgment or order appealed from is affirmed, 
or the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed, the 
appellant shall pay the damage suffered by 
the waste and the value of the use and 
occupancy of the property, or the part of it 
as to which the judgment or order is 
affirmed, from the time of the taking of the 
appeal until the delivery of the possession 
of the property. 
Cal. Civil Practice Code § 917.4 (Deering 
1993). 
That portion of the Judgment which Hansen seeks to 
enforce by the Utah Court Action relates to a conveyance of real 
property as part of the property settlement between Hansen and 
Furmanski in connection with their divorce. Section 917.4 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure clearly controls as to the 
issue of whether an undertaking is required to stay enforcement of 
the Judgment at least as to those portions of the Judgment which 
relate to the disposition of real property. 
As stated by the court in Tradesman's Nat. Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Cumminas Bros. Co., 157 A. 386, 387 (Sup.Ct. N.J. 1931), 
"[t]he pendency of an appeal does not prevent an action on a 
foreign judgment if the appeal does not operate as a supersedeas, 
or stay of proceedings in the jurisdiction where it was rendered 
or if there has not been a compliance with the requisite 
conditions to obtain supersedeas." As set forth above, California 
law requires the filing of an undertaking to stay enforcement of 
a judgment directing disposition of real property. Furmanski has 
f«\HnK\i47\nfttQ?nn m 1 2 
never filed the requisite undertaking to stay enforcement of the 
Judgment as to the Property. Therefore, despite the pendency 
before the U.S. Supreme Court of his petition for writ of 
certiorari, the Judgment, as a matter of law, is presently 
enforceable in Utah.6 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INVOKED SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE UNDER RULE 70 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Despite Furmanski's contention in Issue E of his brief, 
Hansen's request that the trial court employ Rule 70 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure was not first made orally in the hearing 
on April 19, 1993. Rather, Hansen, in Section II. C. of the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of her motion for 
summary judgment, which Memorandum was served upon Furmanski and 
Furmanski Corp., urged the Court to specifically enforce the 
Judgment by making use of Rule 70.7 (R. 259-260.) Since 
6Furmanski's Issue A urges error by the trial court in 
calling the Judgment res judicata. Whether the Judgment is 
technically res judicata as a matter of law while an appeal is 
pending is not the determinative issue. The critical issue is 
whether the Judgment is enforceable in Utah during the pendency 
of Furmanski's appeal. Under Section 917.4 of the California 
Code of Civil Procedure, the Judgment is not stayed unless an 
undertaking is given. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 
its ruling. 
7Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title. 
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance 
of land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to 
perform any other specific act and the party fails to 
comply within the time specified, the court may direct 
the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient 
party by some other person appointed by the court and 
the act when so done has like effect as if done by the 
(continued...) 
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Furmanski had adequate notice that Hansen had requested Rule 70 
relief, he had ample opportunity to argue against it and no 
violation of procedural due process exists. Additionally, Rule 
70, by its own terms, does not require any sort of notice before 
it may be exercised. Implementation of the provisions of the Rule 
are entirely within the court's discretion as a means of 
specifically enforcing court orders as against disobedient 
parties. As stated in Morris v. Svkes, 624 P. 2d 681 at 684, 
M[s]pecific performance is a remedy of equity which is addressed 
to the sense of justice and good conscience of the court, and 
accordingly, considerable latitude of discretion is allowed in his 
determination as to whether it shall be granted and what judgment 
should be entered in respect thereto; and his ruling thereon 
should not be upset on appeal unless it clearly appears that he 
has abused his discretion. . . . " 
7(...continued) 
party. On application of the party entitled to 
performance and upon order of the court, the clerk 
shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration 
against the property of the disobedient party to 
compel obedience to the judgment. The court may also 
in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If 
real or personal property is within the state, the 
court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may 
enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and 
vesting it in others and such judgment has the effect 
of a conveyance executed in due form of law. When any 
order or judgment is for the delivery of possession, 
the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to 
a writ of execution or assistance upon application to 
the clerk. 
Rule 70, U.R.C.P. 
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Furmanski's history of non-compliance with court orders 
and his vindictiveness towards Hansen gave the trial court good 
cause to believe that he would not voluntarily convey the Property 
despite the court's granting of summary judgment in favor of 
Hansen• The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that use of Rule 70 was appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Furmanski and Furmanski Corp. have presented no evidence 
or argument that justifies reversal of the trial court's decisions 
below. The trial court properly extended full faith and credit to 
the Judgment since there were no genuine issues of material fact 
as to the California Court's jurisdiction and, as a matter of law, 
the pendency of Furmanski's appeal of the Judgment did not 
automatically stay enforcement of the Judgment as to the Property. 
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in invoking 
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to specifically 
enforce the conveyance of the Property in light of Furmanski's 
past refusal to voluntarily convey title. The trial court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of August, 1993. 
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Appellants Stanley Furmanski, Karen Ibara and Ibara 
Land Trading Co. (Ibara Land) appeal from a further judgment on 
reserved issues in favor of respondent Gail Hansen filed on 
August 31, 1989. Attorney Alda Shelton appeals from an order 
imposing $2,500 in sanctions. We affirm. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Furmanski and Hansen (formerly Gail Hansen Furmanski), 
both physicians specializing in radiology, were married on 
December 21, 1974, In October 1984, Furmanski filed a petition 
for dissolution. Furmanski and Hansen's status of marriage was 
terminated on October 7, 1985. In the years that followed, a 
war involving the distribution of assets was waged.1/ During 
this time, Furmanski*s new wife Karen Ibara, claimed that 
i^ A personal war was also waged by Furmanski and Ibara 
against Hansen. For example, Ibara paid $25,000 to have Hansen 
(Footnote continued.) 
community property located in Manhattan Beach belonged to her, 
or her corporation, Ibara Land. Ibara filed a civil suit on 
her behalf and on behalf of Ibara Land claiming this property. 
Hansen cross-complained, asserting numerous causes of action, 
including fraud. This civil suit was consolidated with the 
dissolution action and other civil suits. Questions persisted 
as to the property rights of Furmanski, Ibara, Ibara Land and 
Hansen, including the ownership rights to 2206 and 2206 1/2 The 
Strand, two condominiums located on the same lot. Further, 
during the pendency of the actions, Furmanski and Ibara filed 
numerous bankruptcy petitions, writ petitions, and one appeal, 
all in an effort to delay the final adjudication of the issues 
and to deprive Hansen of her property.-2/ 
On May 24, 1989, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 
section 128.5, attorney Alda Shelton, who represented Ibara 
Land, was sanctioned $2,500. 
Finally, on August 31, 1989, the court resolved the 
killed, a plot of which Furmanski was aware and approved. 
Ibara eventually pled guilty to solicitation to commit murder. 
After serving one year in prison, Ibara was released and 
subsequently married Furmanski. During this time, Furmanski 
was also arrested for burglary of Hansen's home. 
2/ In an unpublished opinion filed April 24, 1992 (B042426), 
we upheld the May 19, 1989 orders directing Furmanski and Ibara 
to vacate the condominium located at 2206 1/2 The Strand in 
Manhattan Beach and ordering Furmanski to pay Hansen $300,000 
in attorney's fees. Reluctantly, we reversed other orders on 
the ground the state court lacked jurisdiction to issue those 
orders because the matter had been removed to the federal court. 
We take judicial notice of this previous appeal. 
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remaining property issues by entering a further judgment on 
reserved issues. In this judgment: (1) Furmanski was ordered 
to pay Hansen the sum of $230,000 in attorney fees, which sum 
was in addition to the $300,000 previously ordered; (2) certain 
property was awarded to Furmanski; (3) certain property was 
awarded to Hansen, including the real property located at 2206 
and 2206 1/2 The Strand, Manhattan Beach; (4) Furmanski was 
found to have misappropriated $37,000 in community funds; (5) 
Furmanski was given credit for specified lease payments; and 
(6) it was found that numerous entities and/or corporations 
were the alter ego of Furmanski, including Supersoft, Inc. In 
reaching its conclusions, the court wrote an extensive 
statement of decision which included a finding that Furmanski 
and Ibara engaged in a conspiracy to defraud Hansen out of the 
property located at 2206 The Strand. 
Appellants Furmanski, Ibara and Ibara Land contend 
they were denied a jury trial and the state court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the August 31, 1989 order because the 
matter was removed to federal court. Furmanski additionally 
contends the court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay 
$230,000 in attorney's fees and the division of property was 
not equal. Ibara and Ibara Land further contend the court's 
finding of fraud is unsupported by the record, and thus, Hansen 
should not have received the property at 2206 The Strand. 
Attorney Shelton appeals from the order imposing sanctions. 
Additional facts will be discussed where pertinent. 
DISCUSSION 
Jury Trial 
The contention of Furmanski, Ibara and Ibara Land that 
they were denied a jury trial has no merit. Assuming this case 
involved matters which entitled appellants to a jury trial, 
appellants have waived their right to assert this issue on 
appeal.-2/ 
Although written demands for a jury trial were filed^/ 
in March of 1988, appellants have waived their right to assert 
this issue on appeal because appellants did not object or make 
a request for a jury trial at the time trial was commenced 
without a jury. (Escamilla v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. 
(1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 53, 58-64.) On February 21, 1989, 
Furmanski was sworn and testified. When a witness took the 
stand, the trial began. (Haxtman v. Santamarina (1982) 30 
Cal.3d 762, 765; Miller & Lux Inc. v. Superior Court (1923) 192 
Cal. 333, 342.) When appellants did not assert their demand 
for a jury trial at this time, their right to assert this issue 
on appeal was waived.5/ 
3/ There is no right to a jury trial in a dissolution action, 
although the court has the power to order any issue of fact to 
be tried by a jury. (Code Civ. Proc, § 592; In re Marriage of 
Kim (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 364, 373.) In this case, the 
consolidated civil actions between Furmanski and Hansen were 
appropriately part of the dissolution action. 
4/ The record reflects demands for jury trial filed by 
Furmanski, Ibara and Ibara Land. 
5/ We also note that this issue was decided adversely to 
(Footnote continued.) 
Appellants argue that no one understood the trial had 
commenced when Furmanski took the stand, they were misled into 
believing Furmanski1s limited testimony was given only to 
protect the five-year statute of limitations, no waiver was 
intended nor understood, and they requested a jury trial at the 
appropriate time. These arguments misconstrue the record. 
Furmanski took the stand on February 21; thereafter, 
the parties appeared numerous times. Even though no testimony 
was taken during these short appearances, it was noted that the 
trial had already begun. Thus, appellants had numerous 
opportunities to announce their desire for a jury trial. 
When the matter was called for trial on February 21, 
1989, the parties agreed to a continuance so Furmanski could make 
financial arrangements which "may arise out of this litigation; 
and that this continuance is authorizing contemplation of a 
settlement being effected at that time. Mf] The court was 
further [i]nsured by all parties that there would be no motions 
filed, no appeals, no writs sought or further discovery between 
now and that date. Mf] It is also [the court's] understanding 
that [Hansen] was desirous of preventing any possibility that 
the five[-]year statute might run and therefore wishes to call 
[Furmanski] simply to start the proceedings underway . . . .* 
Furmanski was called to the stand, sworn, and testified as to 
his address. The case was continued. 
appellants in the previous appeal and is, therefore, law of the 
case. 
The parties next appeared on March 6, 1989, during 
which time the court addressed, among other issues, the 
representation of Ibara Land. During this discussion, one 
attorney stated "we're in trial already . . . we have started 
trial." Furmanski's counsel also acknowledged the trial had 
begun when he stated "part of [the settlement meetings] was 
that no trial would go forward." During the settlement 
discussions, appellants did not inform the court that they had 
filed a writ petition on that same day. On March 7, 1989, 
proceedings apparently were held, but the matter could not 
proceed because the court of appeal issued a stay upon the 
filing of a writ petition the previous day. 
On March 22, 1989, the parties appeared; it was noted 
the matter had been continued, but it could not proceed because 
a stay had been issued by this court. The parties again 
appeared on March 27, 1989, at which time Furmanski's attorney 
requested she be relieved as counsel. In objecting to the 
motion, Furmanski noted, "it is my understanding the trial has 
already started and to relieve her of the obligation to be 
present at trial would severely hamper my case . . . .H 
Hansen's attorney also noted, "In addition, as Dr. Furmanski 
has noted, trial has commenced, the stay has been lifted, and 
[Hansen] is ready to proceed to trial as scheduled on March 29 
....'• The court then asked Furmanski if another bankruptcy 
action had been filed. Furmanski was evasive and did not 
directly respond to the court's inquiry. Only after the court 
informed Furmanski he could be held in contempt, did Furmanski 
inform the court that bankruptcy documents had been sent to the 
federal court. Two days later, on March 29, 1989, the parties 
again appeared, discussed the most recent bankruptcy filing and 
the fact that Hansen would be filing an ex parte application 
for relief from stay.^/ On March 31, 1989, the parties 
appeared at 10:40 a.m., and it was confirmed that the 
bankruptcy stay had been lifted. The issue of a jury trial was 
raised only after the court stated it would recess until 1:30 
p.m., to allow Furmanski*s counsel to get her records. The 
court denied the request for a jury trial, noting that trial 
had already commenced. Thus, contrary to appellants' 
suggestion, there were numerous times when the parties 
acknowledged the trial had commenced and numerous opportunities 
for appellants to request a jury trial. No one was misled; 
everyone understood the posture of the case. Everyone knew 
that when Furmanski took the stand, the trial began. 
Additionally, the court did not abuse its discretion 
(March v. Pettis (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 473, 478; Winston v. 
Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 600, 602) in refusing to 
grant relief from the waiver of a jury. (Code Civ. Proc, 
§ 631, subd. (d).) The facts above amply demonstrate appellants 
had over one month, from February 21, 1989 (the date the matter 
-£/ Hansen's attorney indicated he was "apprised of the 
potential of Dr. Furmanski [and] his wife doing their fourth 
bankruptcy filing, two by him, two by her . . . .H 
_ Q _ 
was originally set for trial), until March 31, 1989 (the date 
additional testimony was given), to assert their jury requests 
During that time, appellants postured in the bankruptcy court, 
the court of appeal and the trial court delaying the case. 
These actions were contrary to the promises made to the trial 
court on February 21, 1989, that no other actions would be 
taken if the matter was continued. In light of the history of 
this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to grant relief from the waiver of a jury. (March v. 
Pettis, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 480 [relief from waiver of 
jury trial properly denied if it is "used as a 'pretext to 
obtain continuances and thus trifle with justice'"].) 
Appellants also point to a motion for severance and 
request for jury trial to argue all parties knew a jury trial 
was being requested. However, this motion was not filed until 
March 31, 1991, the date the trial was to reconvene and more 
than a month after the matter was originally set for trial. 
This filing simply demonstrates another delay tactic used by 
appellants.^/ 
// 
// 
// 
1/ Appellants have failed to cite any authority for their 
contention it was the court's responsibility to indicate a jury 
trial could be waived. 
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Removal 
The trial court entered its judgment on August 31, 
1989. We are unpersuaded by appellants1 contention the court 
lacked the jurisdiction to enter this judgment because the 
matter had been removed to federal court. 
We outline in chronological order the pertinent events: 
On October 29, 1984, Furmanski filed the dissolution 
action, case no. D128811. On March 7, 1986, Ibara and Ibara 
Land filed their contract complaint, case no. SWC83958. These 
cases, along with cross-actions, were consolidated. On April 7, 
1989, Furmanski filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, case 
no. LA89-07391SB. 
On March 31, 1989, the bankruptcy court issued the 
following order: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: Mf] 1. The 
automatic stay, arising by virtue of 11 U.S.C.A. Section 362 is 
hereby terminated nunc pro tunc as of March 21, 1989 to permit 
Gail Hansen . . . to proceed to trial in all pending state 
court actions. [If] 2. Said relief is for the sole purpose of 
allowing [Hansen] to proceed to trial and to liquidate her 
claims against [Furmanski]. During the pendency of this 
bankruptcy proceeding, [Hansen] is precluded from executing 
upon any judgment received in the state court actions without 
further order of this court. Mf] 3. Any automatic stay which 
arises by virtue of any bankruptcy petition filed by either 
Stanley Furmanski, Karen Ibara, or Ibara Land Trading Company, 
Inc. is to have no force and effect as against [Hansen] for the 
purpose of proceeding to trial for 180 days from entry of this 
order." 
On August 16, 1989, Ibara filed a petition for removal 
of action to United States District Court requesting that civil 
case no. D128811, consolidated with other cases, be removed to 
the federal bankruptcy court. Ibara claimed her civil claims 
should be resolved in the bankruptcy court in case 
no. LA89-07391SB. The docket sheet of the California Superior 
Court reflects the superior court received Ibara1s notice of 
removal of case no. D128811 to the United States District 
Court. The petition stated the case was removed "effective 
upon the filing of this notice . . . ." 
On August 31, 1989, the superior court issued the 
judgment on further issues in the state court, from which 
appellants appeal. 
On October 23, 1989, the federal court remanded 
Ibara*s matter to the bankruptcy court. 
On February 16, 1990, the parties appeared at an in 
camera proceeding in the bankruptcy court, at which time Ibara 
and Furmanski claimed the state court proceedings had been 
removed to the federal court and thus, any state judgment 
(including the August 31, 1989 judgment) was void. In a 
March 13, 1990 order, the bankruptcy court summarized the 
events, rejected appellants* claim and decreed that the state 
court judgment was valid. 
The March 13, 1990 order reads in part: "[T]he 
parties brought to the attention of the Court and raised 
certain issues in respect of the effect and validity of certain 
pronouncements, Judgments and Orders issued by the Honorable 
James G. Kolts, Judge of the Superior Court for the County of 
Los Angeles, State of California, filed and entered on May 19, 
1989 and August 31, 1989, in the context of a certain State 
Court marital dissolution action . . . and three civil actions 
consolidated therewith . . . . [If] The Court having been 
advised of the purported removal of the Consolidated Actions, 
[If] THE COURT HEREBY FINDS: Mf] [That trial on the 
consolidated actions commenced on February 21, 1989, that 
Furmanski filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy action on February 28, 
1989, which was thereafter dismissed, that Furmanski then filed 
another Chapter 13 Bankruptcy petition, that the bankruptcy 
court's order of March 31, 1989, entered nunc pro tunc 
authorized the parties to proceed in the state court, that the 
second Chapter 13 petition was dismissed when Furmanski failed 
to comply with his debtor obligations, that prior to the 
dismissal of the second bankruptcy petition Furmanski filed 
this Chapter 11 petition, that trial in the California court 
proceeded in reliance on the federal court's order in which 
Furmanski and Hansen actively participated, that Judge Kolts 
issued a memorandum of intended decision, that] [s]ubsequent to 
the issuance of the Memorandum of Intended Decision, but prior 
to the August 31, 1989 entry of the Statement of Decision 
(Exhibit •4') • . . on or about August 16, 1989, without notice 
to or service upon Dr. Hansen, or counsel therefor, Ibara, 
[Furmanski's] present spouse, purported to remove the 
Consolidated Actions to the United States District Court . . . 
Mf] Ibara and [Furmanski] have contended in the course of the 
conference . . . that, as a result of the removal, the State 
Court's pronouncements, Judgments and Orders annexed hereto are 
not valid or binding, Mf] BASED UPON THE FOREGOING, and it 
appearing in the best interest of the proper administration of 
this estate, the principles of judicial economy, and the 
doctrine of comity, it is hereby [If] ORDER [ED], ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED, that the pronouncements, Judgments and Orders annexed 
hereto [including the August 31, 1989 decision] are valid, 
binding, enforceable, adopted by this Court and so entered, 
and, it is further Mf] ORDERED, that, notwithstanding the 
pendency of this Chapter 11 case, at such time as the remand of 
the Consolidated Actions to the State Court is effected, the 
State Court shall have the full right, power and authority to 
amend, modify, alter or enforce the foregoing pronouncements, 
Judgments and Orders adopted and entered by this Court as may 
be appropriate under the circumstances." 
On May 10, 1990, the bankruptcy court filed a 
supplemental order of clarification. This supplemental order 
reaffirmed its prior decision that the state court had the 
jurisdiction to act, determined that Hansen could proceeci with 
her action in state court and additionally permitted Hansen to 
claim assets of Furmanski's bankruptcy estate to satisfy any 
court orders. The supplemental order said in pertinent part: 
"[I]t is hereby ORDERED, that the Bankruptcy Court shall retain 
jurisdiction to determine claims of creditors, except for those 
claims of Gail C. Hansen, M.D., which determination has 
heretofore been made by the State court in its Statement of 
Decision dated August 31, 1989, and to distribute assets of the 
estate to pay those claims . . . and it is further ORDERED, 
that nothing in this Order is intended to, nor does it in any 
way alter, amend or affect the parties' rights to appeal the 
pending State Court pronouncements, Judgments or Orders, seek 
the reconsideration of such State Court pronouncements, 
Judgments or Orders, seek the modification of any such State 
Court pronouncements, Judgments or Orders or take any other 
action in the State Court as it affects said State Court 
pronouncements, Judgments or Orders, and it is further ORDERED 
that other than as noted herein the prior Order shall remain in 
full force and effect." 
Appellants cite to, among other authority, 28 U^S.C. 
section 1446, Laouna Village, Inc. v. Laborers' Internat. Union 
of North America (1983) 35 Cal.3d 174 and Suqimoto v. 
Exportadora de Sal (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 165, to argue the 
August 31, 1989 state court judgment is void because the matter 
was removed to the federal court as soon as the petition for 
removal was filed with the federal court. 
28 U.S.C. section 1446 governs removal to state 
courts. It makes removal effective upon the filing of a 
petition of removal in the federal court, the service of the 
petition on the courts and the parties.^ Thus, "[w]hen a 
removal petition is filed and proper notice is given, the 
entire case is transferred to the federal district court,M 
(Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (11th Cir.1988) 861 F.2d 1248, 
1251.) 
The issue as to whether removal voided the August 31, 
1989 judgment has been raised and resolved in the bankruptcy 
court. The bankruptcy court orders of March 31, 1989, 
March 13, 1990, and May 10, 1990, indicate the bankruptcy court 
specifically examined the issue as to whether the case was 
removed to the federal court which would have deprived the 
state court of the jurisdiction to proceed with Hansen's 
claims. The bankruptcy court, which had all information before 
it necessary to make such a determination, specifically gave 
the state court the power to proceed, found the federal court 
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, determined the 
Section 1446 reads in part: (a) A defendant or defendants 
desiring to remove any civil action . , . from a State court 
shall file in the district court of the Untied States for the 
district and division . . . a notice of removal signed pursuant 
to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
containing a shorthand plain statement of the grounds for 
removal/ together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and 
orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such 
action. Mf] (d) Promptly after the filing of such petition 
for the removal of a civil action and bond the defendant or 
defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse 
parties and shall file a copy of the petition with the clerk of 
such State court, which shall effect the removal and the State 
court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is 
remanded." 
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state court's judgments, including the August 31, 1989 decree, 
were valid and enforceable. The bankruptcy court has already 
examined the federal laws and concluded the state court 
judgments and orders were not void. We must give full faith 
and credit "to a final order or judgment of a federal court. 
[Citations.] Such an order or judgment has the same effect in 
the courts of this state as it would in federal court. 
[Citations.] In the federal jurisdiction, the doctrine of res 
judicata prevents the readjudication of all matters (including 
jurisdiction) which were, or might have been, litigated in a 
prior proceeding between the same parties." (Lew v. Cohen 
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 165, 172-173; U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1.) 
Thus, we are bound by the decisions on this issue made in the 
bankruptcy court.2/ (366-368 Geary St., L.P. v. Superior Court 
(1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1186, 1197.) 
In contending the state court could not proceed, 
appellants also discuss other actions in the bankruptcy court, 
2/ Furmanski, in effect, concedes the bankruptcy court orders 
resolved the issues when he argues that Hansen "submitted to 
the jurisdiction of the federal court on the issue of 
removal." Additionally, appellants erroneously suggest the 
bankruptcy judge could not give full faith and credit to the 
August 31, 1989 judgment, since it was void and since the state 
court's decision was on appeal it could not be conclusive. 
However, the bankruptcy court was not giving full faith and 
credit to the state court judgment or determining if it was 
conclusive on that court; rather, the bankruptcy court 
evaluated appellants* argument that the case was removed, 
rejected that argument, and found the state court order was 
enforceable. As appellants conceded, the federal courts have 
the jurisdiction to determine if the removal was proper. 
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such as a relief from stay motion made by Hansen. However, 
having not cited to any evidence to support these contentions, 
we need not evaluate the discussions based thereon. 
(Huntington Landmark Adult Community Assn. v. Ross (1989) 213 
Cal.App.3d 1012, 1021; Atchley v. Citv of Fresno (1984) 151 
Cal.App.3d 635, 647; Rossiter v. Benoit (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 
706, 710-711.) Appellants further argue Hansen acquiesced to 
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by filing a claim in 
that court. However, appellants1 citation to the record to 
support this argument is to a proof of claim, a document filed 
by Hansen's attorneys for themselves as creditors for unpaid 
attorney's fees. This document was not filed by Hansen nor can 
it be interpreted to suggest Hansen acquiesced to the bankruptcy 
court with regard to her property claims.-i-2/ 
We conclude the August 31, 1989 judgment is valid 
ifi/ Appellants make a number of other contentions, all based 
upon the assumption the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to 
act. Inasmuch as the court had jurisdiction to act, these 
contentions obviously are without merit. Thus, appellants were 
not denied due process, the trial court's judgment is 
enforceable, the trial court's judgment has res judicata effect 
and is entitled to full faith and credit and the judgment is 
not void. 
Appellants also contend, citing Northern Pipeline Const, v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 50 [102 S.Ct. 2858], the 
bankruptcy judge, as a non-article III judge, was foreclosed 
from ruling on California state issues, and thus, he could not 
make determinations regarding the division of community 
property. Since the orders discussed above deal with federal 
jurisdiction, this argument has no relevancy. We also note 
that appellants' discussion on this issue fails to discuss the 
federal legislative events after Northern Pipeline. 
Attorney's Fees 
We are not persuaded by Furmanski1s contention the 
court abused its discretion (In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 
37 Cal.3d 762, 768-769; In re Marriage of Hublou (1991) 231 
Cal.App.3d 956, 965) in awarding Hansen an additional sum of 
$230,000 in attorney's fees.11/ 
The court's 43-page statement of decision of the award 
fully explained the reasons supporting this award. The 
testimony of Hansen's attorney, as well as other facts, 
provided the evidence. As the court noted, Hansen's need was 
demonstrated as was Furmanski's ability to pay because, among 
other reasons, Hansen incurred at least $580,000 in fees, 
Hansen was forced to borrow money to make payments, Furmanski 
grossed approximately three times as much per year as Hansen 
and Furmanski put forth a scheme to claim his income was 
depressed. The court also found the overwhelming majority of 
Hansen's attorney's fees were due to Furmanski's obstructive 
tactics including the filing of numerous suits, one of which 
was a sham and one of which was collusive, Furmanski's lack of 
cooperation during the discovery process, Furmanski's defective 
and confusing pleadings, the delays caused by the misuse of the 
bankruptcy courts and the numerous civil actions, disruption 
11/ In the prior appeal (case no. B042426), we affirmed the 
preliminary order directing Furmanski to pay Hansen $300,000 in 
attorney's fees. (See fn. 1 above.) 
caused by the use of writ proceedings, and Furmanski's refusal 
to answer questions during trial, which caused additional 
delay. The court also found Hansen's testimony was credible on 
this issue, whereas Furmanski's was not. (See discussion In re 
Marriage of Huhlou. supra, 231 Cal.App.3d 956.) 
Hansen's trial attorney testified his firm had 
represented Hansen since the inception of the litigation in 
1984. He testified that although the case was not complex, 
Furmanski did everything possible to prolong and complicate the 
division of the over $4,000,000 in assets. These disruptive 
actions included filing a variety of suits, voluminous pleadings 
and exhibits and motions, attempting to hide assets through 
corporations for which either Furmanski or Ibara fronted/ 
obstructing discovery, transferring property in violation of 
court orders, and refusing to settle. For only the second time 
in his thirty-year career, attorney Buter was forced to utilize 
a second attorney during trial. All of these events resulted 
in attorney's t€^ es and eosii.> incurred in excess ut $582»-b7. 
Since Buter's testimony was found to be credible, an evaluation 
left to the trier of fact, we do not find persuasive Furmanski's 
suggestion thdt the tees were not incurred. 
These reasons, in addition to the fact that attorney's 
fees may be assessed under a dissolution proceeding as a result 
of litigating intertwined issues in consolidated actions (In re 
Marriage of Seaman & Meniou (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1497; In 
re Marriage of Green (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 14, 28, fn. 8; In re 
Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36; Guardianship of 
Paduano (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 346, 350-352), amply support the 
attorney's fee award and demonstrate it was not excessive. (in 
re Marriage of Melone (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 757, 763-766 [in 
awarding attorney's fees proper for court to consider actions 
which increased cost of litigation].) Additionally, contrary 
to Furmanski's contention, in determining the amount of 
attorney's fees to be paid by Furmanski, the court did consider 
Hansen's income, savings and ability to pay. 
Division of Community Property 
Furmanski also contends the court did not equally 
divide the community property. Furmanski bases his argument on 
this issue on two assertions: (1) the court undervalued the two 
Strand properties as worth $600,000 and $650,000, and (2) Super 
Soft, Inc. was the owner of 2206 1/2 The Strand and not him. 
To support his first claim, Furmanski points to the 
testimony of his expert who testified the two Strand properties 
were worth $775,000 and $750,000, respectively. However, 
Furmanski fails to acknowledge that exhibit 1115, an appraisal 
of the property, and Hansen's appraiser valued the properties 
at $600,000 and $650,000 respectively, and Hansen's appraiser 
was found to be more credible than Furmanski's. Additionally, 
Hansen testified, without objection, that she believed 2206 The 
Strand was worth anywhere between $500,000 and $600,000 and 
-?0-
2206 1/2 The Strand was worth approximately $650,000 to 
$750,000. The court was free to disbelieve Furmanski's expert 
and believe the other evidence on this issue. There was 
substantial evidence to support the court's conclusion. 
Additionally, inasmuch as the trial court found that 
Supersoft, Inc. was Furmanski's alter ego, Furmanski was in 
effect the owner of 2206 1/2 The Strand. Thus, Furmanski is 
foreclosed from arguing he did not own the property.12/ 
Ibara and Ibara Land also assert for the first time in 
their joint reply brief the community property was not equally 
divided. These parties do not, however, cite any authority 
which gives them standing to assert issues dealing with the 
marriage between Furmanski and Hansen. Further, no authority 
is provided to support the allegation that the court could not 
award the liquid assets to Hansen; there are no citations to 
the record to show the absence of substantial evidence to 
support the court's evaluations of Furmanski's medical practice 
and the Mulhoi1 and property. Thus, we need not address thesf 
arguments. (Huntington Landmark Adult Community Assn. v Ross. 
supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 1021; Atchley v. City of Fresno, 
supra, 151 fal.App.^d at p. 647; Rossiter v. Benoit, supra, 88 
—
/
 Approximately one and one-half years after the state court 
order dividing the marital property, the bankruptcy court 
removed a stay so Hansen and Union Federal Savings Bank could 
exercise their rights after foreclosure sale. Tn issuing its 
order, the bankruptcy court concluded that title to 2206 1/2 
The Strand was vested 95 percent with Super Soft, Inc. and, 
thus, could not be part of Furmanski's bankruptcy estate. 
** i 
Cal.App.3d at p. 710-711.) We do note, however, that the trial 
court found Hansen's valuation expert to be more reliable than 
Furmanski*s as to the fair market value of the Mulholland 
property, and the only expert testimony on the value of 
Furmanski's medical practice was presented by Hansen, 
Fraud Against Ibara and Ibara Land 
The action brought by Ibara and Ibara Land claimed 
entitlement to the condominium located at 2206 The Strand, 
Hansen cross-complained for fraud. The basis for the Ibara 
claim was a repurchase option signed by Hansen and Furmanski 
purportedly giving Ibara Land the right to purchase the 
property for $300,000. The court determined the repurchase 
option (which was purportedly exercised after Furmanski filed 
his dissolution petition) was fraudulently obtained and that 
neither Ibara nor Ibara Land had any rights to the property. 
On appeal, Ibara and Ibara Land contend there is no 
substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion of 
fraud. We find no merit to this contention. 
All of the following facts were shown by the 
evidence: In 1978, Furmanski and Hansen wished to purchase 
2206 The Strand. Hansen believed Furmanski when he stated 
there would be a tax advantage if the purchase of the 2206 The 
13/ There were three units on this parcel of property; 2206 The 
(Footnote continued.) 
Strand property was structured such that it was first 
transferred from the present owners to a third entity, which 
would in turn, transfer the property to Furmanski and Hansen. 
Furmanski handled the family business affairs and Hansen had no 
reason to disbelieve Furmanski. Hansen had no reason to be 
concerned because she trusted him. Furmanski told Hansen she 
should "not . . . worry, that everything was okay and this 
would be a better way to do it." Furmanski told Hansen a woman 
with whom he worked, Ibara, would assist them with the 
transaction and that Hansen could trust Ibara. 
The owners of 2206 The Strand signed an option with 
Ibara Land for the price of $10. On the day the property was 
bought by Ibara Land for $183,000, Ibara Land, in turn, sold 
the property to Furmanski and Hansen. What Furmanski did not 
tell Hansen was that when she signed the escrow papers to 
purchase the unit, she also signed a document, a repurchase 
option, which gave Ibara Land (an Oregon corporation set up by 
Furmanski) an option to repurchase the property for $300,000, 
Had Hansen known of the repurchase agreement, Hansen would not 
have agreed to the arrangement and she would not have signed 
the document.^/ While Hansen was signing the documents, 
Strand was the middle tier and 2206 1/2 The Strand was on the 
third, or top level. The top unit (2206 1/2 The Strand) had 
the better view, After purchasing 2206 The Strand, 2206 1/2 
The Strand was bought with intent that the two units would be 
joined. 
14/ The document read in part: "In consideration of this 
(Footnote continued.) 
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Furmanski assured Hansen all documents were in order, and she 
should "just sign them." Ibara was not present when Hansen 
signed the documents; Hansen did not meet Ibara until later. 
Furmanski also did not inform Hansen he had been having an 
affair with Ibara for many years. 
At the time, Ibara was 22 years old. She had no 
experience in real estate. She was ignorant of most of the 
details of the incorporation which created Ibara Land. As the 
court noted, Furmanski, with the assistance of Ibara, 
fraudulently constructed the sales transaction such that Ibara 
Land could repurchase the property. Hansen trusted Furmanski 
and, thus, believed him when he stated that all documents were 
in order and she should Mjust sign" it. Because Furmanski 
handled all marital business affairs, Hansen reasonably relied 
upon him and is entitled to rescind the transaction. (Danzig 
v. Jack Grynberg & Associates (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1138; 
Joraensen v. Joraensen (1948) 32 Cal.2d 13, 19-23.) Although a 
person usually cannot avoid provisions of written documents by 
not reading them (Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club (1986) 186 
Cal.App.3d 1309, 1318; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals 
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 710), a person is not bound to such 
agreement, whereby Purchasers gain title to the Property, the 
Purchasers (Stanley and Gail H. Furmanski), hereby grant a 
REPURCHASE OPTION to the Ibara Land Trading Company Inc., 
(optionee), which option shall be a sole and exclusive option 
to Ibara Land Trading Company Inc., or its assigns to repurchase 
the property during the option term of seven years from this 
date [December 28, 1978] at a fixed sales price of $300,000 
cash." 
provisions if there is fraud. (Danzig v. Jack Grvnberg & 
Associates, supra, at p. 1138; Bolanos v. Khalatian (1991) 231 
Cal.App.3d 1586, 1590.) 
Even though Hansen did not meet Ibara, the facts 
sufficiently establish a conspiracy between Ibara and Furmanski 
to defraud. Ibara and Ibara Land, therefore, are also 
responsible for the fraudulent conduct of Furmanski. (Cf. 
Danzig v. Jack Grvnberg & Associates, supra, at p. 1141.) Even 
though the fraudulent behavior occurred years before the filing 
of the dissolution action, contrary to appellants1 argument, 
Hansen is not precluded from asserting her rights to the 
property. Fraud was evidenced by the representations made fay 
Furmanski, the concealment and existence of the repurchase 
agreement and the damages to Hansen. (BAJI (7th ed.) No. 1251.) 
The statute of limitations does not accrue until the 
aggrieved party discovers the fraud upon exercising a 
reasonable duty to inquire. (Code Civ. P r o c , § 338, subd. 
(d) .) W h e n t h e p a r t i e s a r e i n a c o n f i d e n t i a 1 i: e 1 a t i o n s; h i p, 
however, the duty of the defrauded to inquire does not arise 
until the relationship is repudiated. (Lee v. Escrow 
Consultants, Inc. (1989) 21 0 Cal App.3d 915, 921 ) Although 
Ibara and Ibara Land argue Hansen is foreclosed by estoppel and 
laches from asserting her rights, there was no showing Hansen 
was aware of the repurchase agreement until Ibara, years later, 
claimed she had rights to the property. 
Appellants also suggest the California Property Record 
Act precludes Hansen from acquiring this property. Since this 
assertion is unaccompanied by proper discussion or citation, we 
need not address it. (Huntington Landmark Adult Community 
Assn. v. Ross, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 1021; Atchlev v. 
Citv of Fresno, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 647; Rossiter v. 
Benoit. supra, 88 Cal.App.3d at pp. 710-711.) 
Sanction Order Against Shelton 
We are not persuaded by attorney Shelton's contention 
that the May 24, 1989 $2,500 sanction order issued pursuant to 
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 was an abuse of the 
court's discretion. (Luke v. Baldwin-United Corp. (1985) 167 
Cal.App.3d 664, 668.) 
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 permits the court 
to "order a . . . party's attorney . . . to pay any reasonable 
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party 
as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous 
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. • . .H The 
section was designed to enable courts to M'manage their 
calendars and provide for the expeditious processing of civil 
actions . • . . ,H (County of Imperial v. Farmer (1988) 205 
Cal.App.3d 479, 485.) Attorneys who, in bad faith, use tactics 
merely to delay are properly sanctioned. (In re Marriage of 
Ouinlan (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1417, 1422; Cosenza v. Kramer 
(1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1102-1103.) Additionally, while a 
court may only sanction for actions occurring in that court 
(Coast Sav. St Loan Assn. v. Black (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1494, 
1500; cf. County of Imperial v. Farmer, supra, at p. 485), the 
court may examine the history of the litigation in determining 
the motives behind the actions being examined. (E.g., Coast 
Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Black, supra.) 
Here, the trial court provided numerous reasons for 
imposing sanctions upon Shelton, the attorney for Ibara Land. 
These included, (1) mutilating a substitution of attorney form 
so Hansen could not "determine an address where service of 
process could be effected" on an order shortening time and (2) 
filing a writ contrary to her statements made to the court.-15/ 
15/ The court found: 
"1. Alda Shelton engaged in a cause of conduct designed to 
frustrate the ends of justice by filing a substitution of 
attorney when counsel for Respondent sought to serve an 
application for an order shortening time. This was 
accomplished by substituting Ibara in pro per in place of Alda 
Shelton, and mutilat[ing] the substitution so that it was not 
possible to determine an address where service of process could 
be effected. 
"2. On March 6, 1989, after trial had begun, counsel and 
parties were involved in negotiations for settlement. Contrary 
to her stated intention during the morning discussions, Shelton 
as counsel for Ibara and/or Ibara Land Trading Company, filed a 
petition for writ of prohibition during the noon recess. That 
afternoon proceedings were conducted in open court in which all 
parties, including Ibara, and Ibara Land Trading Company waived 
the matters contained in the writ application. Shelton failed 
to disclose the fact that she had filed such a writ with the 
Court of Appeal, and the trial court was unaware of this fili..M 
until the following day when the Court of Appeal called, 
notifying the trial court of a temporary stay." 
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The court found these incidents, as well as other conduct,^-/ 
to be in bad faith and solely intended to cause unnecessary 
delay. 
The part of the order discussing the filing of a writ 
petition referred to statements made to the court during 
settlement negotiations on the morning of March 6, 1989. 
During discussions with the court, Shelton stated that no 
actions would be taken to delay the case and any objections to 
proceeding would be waived. When this statement was made, 
however, Shelton knew a writ was being filed in the appellate 
court, the result of which was a stay. (The stay was not 
lifted until approximately 15 days later.) By concealing the 
fact that a writ was being filed, Shelton mislead and deceived 
the court, a violation of her ethical obligations as an 
attorney. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d);12/ Rule of 
•lis/ The court also found: 
M3. On April 3, 1989, Shelton filed another application 
for a writ of prohibition with the Court of Appeal. This time, 
the order of the names of the Petitioners was changed, and 
Shelton failed to advise the appellate court of the previous 
application. This delayed trial until April 5, 1989. 
"4. It was also brought to the Court's attention that a 
document associating Mr. Cipriano, co-counsel for Petitioner, 
in this appeal was altered after his signature was affixed and 
did not reflect his participation in the writ procedure. 
"5. The Court concluded that the specific incidents noted 
above, as well as other conduct which served to delay and 
prevent the timely trial of this matter, were in bad faith and 
were solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." 
12/ "it is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following: 
[Footnote continued.] 
Prof. Conduct, rule 5-200, subd. (B);^- 7 Pi Sabatino v. State 
Bar (1980) 27 Cal.3d 159, 162-164.) Such deception is not 
permitted, even if the attorney purports to be representing the 
best interest of his or her client. (Rodqers v. State Bar 
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 300, 315-316.) By failing to inform the court 
and all parties of the true status of the matter, all planned 
their schedules assuming the trial would proceed. Due to the 
very nature of litigation, Hansen's counsel would have expended 
time and efforts anticipating that trial would proceed. The 
parties subsequently appeared, only to be forced to reconvene at 
a later time because the stay was in effect. Further, the court 
and Hansen proceeded as if the parties were engaged in good 
faith settlement negotiations, never anticipating these 
discussions were a sham because of the impending filing of the 
writ. Such an abuse of the process demonstrates bad faith and 
supports an award under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. 11/ 
. . . (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes 
confided to him or her such means only as are consistent with 
truth, and never seek to mislead the judge . . . by an artifice 
or false statement of fact or law." 
IB/ HIn presenting a matter to a tribunal, a member: (B) Shall 
not seek to mislead the judge . . . by an artifice or false 
statement of fact or law.1* 
12/ we are not persuaded by Shelton's statement that there were 
"no grounds to conclude [Shelton] filed the Petition as a 
bad-faith tactic to cause unnecessary delay." The series of 
procedural maneuvers, the voluminous court file, the numerous 
writs, the two appeals, the number of bankruptcy filings and 
some of the arguments on appeal all demonstrate the entire 
matter was prolonged as long as possible; these actions belie 
Shelton's statement. 
(In re Marriage of Gumahan (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 572; cf. 
Cosenza v. Kramer, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 1100.) 
Additionally, mutilating a substitution of attorney 
form so Hansen could not effect service of process would also 
justify the imposition of sanctions. This action, in light of 
all the surrounding circumstances, could reasonably be 
interpreted as another action done simply to delay.20/ 
Shelton suggests the $2,500 sanction award cannot be 
upheld because the only expenses incurred were those expended 
in opposing the writ petition and that a trial court cannot 
sanction for actions in another court. These arguments fail 
for a number of reasons. First, it is an inaccurate reading of 
the record. Hansen's attorney did not ask only for the time 
expended on the writ petition. Hansen's attorney requested 
$25,000 in sanctions, $19,240 of which was attributable to the 
preparation of the writ petition. Further, Hansen's attorney 
noted his time was billed at $325 per hour and the time of his 
associate was billed at $150. The trial court, who was in the 
best position to observe all of the circumstances involved in 
the litigation including the amount of time involved and the 
skill utilized by Hansen's attorney, was within its discretion 
to determine that the reasonable value of the time expended due 
to the dilatory and bad-faith actions of Shelton was $2,500. A 
20/ Even if, as Shelton contends, this finding of fact was 
supported only by hearsay, the finding relating to deceiving 
the trial court would be sufficient by itself to support the 
sanction award. 
precise memorandum was not required, (Cf. Melnyk v. Robledo 
(1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-625.) 
Shelton also contends the motion for sanctions failed 
to comply with procedural requirements because it did not 
adequately apprise her of the legal basis for the motion and 
did not contain points and authorities. However, the sanction 
motion indicated that sanctions were being sought pursuant to 
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, identified the offending 
actions as frivolous and "intended solely to cause unnecessary 
delay,M noted that the course of conduct was pervasive 
throughout the litigation of the matter, specifically 
identified numerous delaying tactics including the intentional 
concealment of the filing of the writ petition in contradiction 
to statements made by Shelton, and discussed the mutilation of 
the substitution of attorney. Thus, contrary to Shelton's 
contention, the document satisfied the notice requirements of 
California Rules of Court, rule 313. 
Since we are affirming the sanction award/ as 
required/ we have directed the clerk of this court to refer 
this matter to the State Bar of California for a determination 
as to whether discipline should be imposed. (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 6086.7/ subd. (c).) 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded 
to respondent Gail Hansen Furmanski. 
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 
GRIGNON, J. 
We concur: 
TURNER, P.J. 
JACKSON, J.* 
* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. 
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DEERING'S CIVIL PROCEDURE §916 
gid judgments as the superior court would 
jjavc in such case, except that if the case was 
pied anew in the superior court, the reviewing 
eourt shall have similar power to review any 
matter and make orders and judgments as it 
lias in a case within the original jurisdiction of 
the superior court. Added Stats 1968 ch 385 
J 2. Within & Epstein, Criminal Law (2d ed) 
$3270; Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Courts 
£$249, 252, 254, 266; Writs §113; Appeal 
i§ 18, 34, 725, 729; Cal Jur 3d Appellate 
Review §§ 16, 685, 686. 
{ 912. Certified copy of judgment or order of 
reriewing court; Remittance to trial court; 
Doty of clerk of trial court. Upon final deter-
mination of an appeal by the reviewing court, 
the clerk of the court shall remit to the trial 
court a certified copy of the judgment or order 
of the reviewing court and of its opinion, if 
iny. The clerk of the trial court, or the judge, 
if there be no clerk, shall file such certified 
copy of the judgment and opinion of the 
reviewing court, shall attach the same to the 
judgment roll if the appeal was from a judg-
ment, and shall enter a note of the judgment 
of the reviewing court stating whether the 
judgment or order appealed from has been 
affirmed, reversed or modified, in the margin 
tf the original entry of such judgment or 
arder, and also in the register of actions or 
locket. Added Stats 1968 ch 385 § 2. Witkin 
Procedure (3d ed) Courts § 254; Appeal §§ 598, 
W; 5 Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §§ 604, 
$07. 
§913. Dismissal of appeal with prejudice; 
Exception. The dismissal of an appeal shall be 
with prejudice to the right to file another 
appeal within the time permitted, unless the 
dismissal is expressly made without prejudice 
to another appeal. Added Stats 1968 ch 385 
§ 2. Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Appeal §§ 508, 
528; Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §§ 398, 581 
§ 914. Phonographic report of trial; Impossi-
bility of transcription; Setting aside or vacat-
ing judgment, eta; New trial. When the right 
to a phonographic report has not been waived 
and when it shall be impossible to have a 
phonographic report of the trial transcribed by 
a stenographic reporter as provided by law or 
by rule, because of the death or disability of a 
reporter who participated as a stenographic 
reporter at the trial or because of the loss or 
destruction, in whole or in substantial part, of 
the notes of such reporter, the trial court or a 
judge thereof, or the reviewing court shall 
have power to set aside and vacate the judg-
ment, order or decree from which an appeal 
has been taken or is to be taken and to order 
a new trial of the action or proceeding. Added 
Stats 1968 ch 385 §2. Witkin & Epstein, 
Criminal Law (2d ed) §3244; Witkin Proce-
dure (3d ed) Attack § 19; Appeal §§ 458, 459; 
Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §§57, 291, New 
Trial§64. 
§915. Enacted 1872 and amended and 
renumbered § 113a by Stats 1933 ch 743 § 25. 
CHAPTER 2 
Stay of Enforcement and Other Proceedings 
ection 
916. 
917.1. 
917.15. 
917.2. 
917.3. 
917.4. 
917.5. 
917.6. 
917.65. 
917.7. 
Stay of proceedings on perfecting appeal; Effect. 
Undertaking to stay enforcement of money judgment or order pending appeal. 
Appeal from certain orders concerning hazardous waste. 
Appeal from judgment or order for assignment or delivery of documents or 
personal property; Placing property in custody of officer of court; Furnishing 
undertaking; Judgment or order directing sale of perishable property. 
Appeal from judgment or order directing execution of instruments. 
Undertaking to stay enforcement of judgment or order directing disposition of real 
property pending appeal. 
Appeal from judgment or order appointing receiver, Undertaking. 
Appeal from judgment or order directing performance of acts specified in 
§§917.1-917.5. 
Undertaking to stay enforcement of order. 
(First of two; Operative until January 1, 1994) Appeal from judgment or order 
affecting custody or right of visitation of minor or exclusion from family 
dwelling; Provisions regarding removal of minor from State. 
Beginning in 1992, 
italics indicate changes or addition*. * • * 529 
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917.7. (Second of two; Operative January 1, 1994) Appeal from judgment or order 
affecting custody or right of visitation of minor or exclusion from family 
dwelling; Provisions regarding removal of minor from State. 
917.8. Appeal involving party adjudged guilty of usurpation, etc., of public office, or 
judgment or order directing right of inspection of corporate books, etc.. 
917.9. Appeal from judgment or order in cases not otherwise provided for; Undertaking. 
918. Stay of enforcement of judgment or order by trial court; Limitation of power. 
918.5. Stay to protect possible set-off. 
919. Appeal by executor, administrator, etc.; Dispensation or limitation of security by 
trial court. 
921. Appeal by party levying attachment; Requisites and conditions of undertaking. 
922. Effect of insufficiency of undertaking. 
923. Powers of reviewing court or judge; Chapter provisions as not limiting. 
936.1. Notice of appeal; Indigents. 
Witkin Procedure (3d ed) EnfJudgm §§60, 183; Appeal § 174; Cal Jur 3d (Rev) Creditors* 
Rights and Remedies §250; Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §§ 182, 195, 203, 243, 656. 
§ 916. Stay of proceedings on perfecting ap-
peal; Effect (a) Except as provided in Sections 
917.1 to 917.9, inclusive, and in Section 
116.810, the perfecting of an appeal stays 
proceedings in the trial court upon the judg-
ment or order appealed from or upon the 
matters embraced therein or affected thereby, 
including enforcement of the judgment or or-
der, but the trial court may proceed upon any 
other matter embraced in the action and not 
affected by the judgment or order, 
(b) When there is a stay of proceedings other 
than the enforcement of the judgment, the 
trial court shall have jurisdiction of proceed-
ings related to the enforcement of the judg-
ment as well as any other matter embraced in 
the action and not affected by the judgment or 
order appealed from. Amended Stats 197S ch 
266 § 5; Stats 1982 ch 497 § 64, operative July 
1, 1983; Stats 1990 ch 1305 § 8 (SB 2627). 
Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Actions §273; Ap-
peal §§6, 7, 9, 175, 205, 206, 219; Witkin 
Summary (9th ed) Trusts §309; Cal Jur 3d 
Administrative Law §340, Appellate Review 
§§173, 174, 182, 184, 192, 241, 242, Dece-
dents' Estates §418, Venue §80; Cal Fam L 
Serv §35:56; Miller & Starr, Cal Real Estate 
2d § 9:17a 
§917. Enacted 1872 and amended and 
renumbered § 113c by Stats 1933 ch 743 § 27. 
§ 917.1. Undertaking to stay enforcement of 
money judgment or order pending appeal, (a) 
The perfecting of an appeal shall not stay 
enforcement of the judgment or order in the 
trial court if the judgment or order is for 
money or directs the payment of money, 
whether consisting of a special fund or not, 
and whether payable by the appellant or an-
other party to the action, unless an undertak-
ing is given. 
(b) The undertaking shall be on condition that 
if the judgment or order or any part of it is 
affirmed or the appeal is withdrawn or dis-
missed, the party ordered to pay shall pay the 
amount of the judgment or order, or the part 
of it as to which the judgment or order is 
affirmed, as entered after the receipt of the 
remittitur, together with any interest which 
may have accrued pending the appeal and 
entry of the remittitur, and costs which may 
be awarded against the appellant on appeal. 
This section shall not apply in cases where the 
money to be paid is in the actual or construc-
tive custody of the court; and such cases shall 
be governed, instead, by the provisions of 
Section 917.2. The undertaking shall be for 
double the amount of the judgment or order 
unless given by an admitted surety insurer in 
which event it shall be for one and one-half 
times the amount of the judgment or order. 
The liability on the undertaking may be en-
forced if the party ordered to pay does not 
make the payment within 30 days after the 
filing of the remittitur from the reviewing 
court 
(c) If a surety on the undertaking pays the 
judgment, either with or without action, after 
the judgment is affirmed, the surety is substi-
tuted to the rights of the creditor and is 
entitled to control, enforce, and satisfy the 
judgment, in all respects as if the surety had 
recovered the judgment 
(d) Costs awarded by the trial court under 
Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1021) of 
Title 14 shall be included in the amount of the 
judgment or order for the purpose of applying 
subdivisions (a) and (b). Amended Stats 1981 
ch 196 § 1; Stats 1982 ch 517 § 155; Stats 1986 
ch 1174 § 1. Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Prov 
Rem §22; EnfJudgm §403; Appeal §§18, 
R*n 
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DEERING'S CIVIL PROCEDURE § 917.4 
182 et seq; Cal Jur 3d (Rev) Ejectment and 
Related Remedies § 74; Cal Jur 3d Appellate 
Review §§ 192, 198, 202, 214, 215, Suretyship 
and Guaranty §§2, 86 et seq; Cal Fam L Serv 
§35:59. 
§917.15. Appeal from certain orders con-
cerning hazardous waste. The perfecting of an 
appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judg-
ment or order in the trial court if the judgment 
or order appealed from, or the administrative 
order which is the subject of the trial court 
proceeding, was issued pursuant to either of 
the following: 
(a) Subdivision (a) of Section 25358.3 of the 
Health and Safety Code and ordered a respon-
sible party to take appropriate removal or 
remedial actions in response to a release or a 
threatened release of a hazardous substance. 
(b) Section 25181 of the Health and Safety 
Code and ordered the party to comply with 
Chapter 6.5 (commencing with Section 25100) 
of Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code 
or any rule, regulation, permit, covenant, stan-
dard, requirement, or order issued, adopted or 
executed pursuant to that Chapter 6.5. Added 
Stats 1985 ch 1492 § 1. 
§ 917 J . Appeal from judgment or order for 
assignment or delivery of documents or per-
sonal property; Placing property in custody of 
officer of court; Furnishing undertaking; Judg-
ment or order directing sale of perishable 
property. The perfecting of an appeal shall not 
stay enforcement of the judgment or order of 
the trial court if the judgment or order ap-
pealed from directs the assignment or delivery 
of personal property, including documents, 
whether by the appellant or another party to 
the action, or the sale of personal property 
upon the foreclosure of a mortgage, or other 
hen thereon, unless an undertaking in a sum 
and upon conditions fixed by the trial court, is 
given that the appellant or party ordered to 
assign or dehver the property will obey and 
satisfy the order of the reviewing court, and 
will not commit or suffer to be committed any 
damage to the property, and that if the judg-
ment or order appealed from is affirmed, or 
the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed, the 
appellant shall pay the damage suffered to 
such property and the value of the use of such 
property for the period of the delay caused by 
the appeal. The appellant may cause the prop-
erty to be placed in the custody of an officer 
designated by the court to abide the order of 
the reviewing court, and such fact shall be 
considered by the court in fixing the amount 
of the undertaking. If the judgment or order 
appealed from directs the sale of perishable 
roperty the trial court may order such prop-
erty to be sold and the proceeds thereof to be 
deposited with the clerk of the trial court to 
abide the order of the reviewing court; such 
fact shall be considered by the court in fixing 
the amount of the undertaking. Added Stats 
1968 ch 385 § 2; Amended Stats 1972 ch 546 
§ 2. Witkin Procedure (3d ed) Appeal §§ 182 et 
seq., 212, 221, 238; Cal Jur 3d Appellate Re-
view §§ 187, 198, 199, 202, 212, Suretyship and 
Guaranty §§2, 82. 
§ 917.3. Appeal from judgment or order di-
recting execution of instruments. The perfect-
ing of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of 
the judgment or order in the trial court if the 
judgment or order appealed from directs the 
execution of one or more instruments unless 
the instrument or instruments are executed 
and deposited in the office of the clerk of the 
court where the original judgment or order is 
entered to abide the order of the reviewing 
court. Added Stats 1968 ch 385 § 2. Witkin 
Procedure (3d ed) Appeal §§ 212, 225, 238; Cal 
Jur 3d Appellate Review § 197, Suretyship and 
Guaranty § 2. 
§ 917.4. Undertaking to stay enforcement of 
judgment or order directing disposition of real 
property pending appeal. The perfecting of an 
appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judg-
ment or order in the trial court if the judgment 
or order appealed from directs the sale, con-
veyance or delivery of possession of real prop-
erty which is in the possession or control of 
the appellant or the party ordered to sell, 
convey or dehver possession of the property, 
unless an undertaking in a sum fixed by the 
trial court is given that the appellant or party 
ordered to sell, convey or dehver possession of 
the property will not commit or suffer to be 
committed any waste thereon and that if the 
judgment or order appealed from is affirmed, 
or the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed, the 
appellant shall pay the damage suffered by the 
waste and the value of the use and occupancy 
of the property, or the part of it as to which 
the judgment or order is affirmed, from the 
time of the taking of the appeal until the 
delivery of the possession of the property. If 
the judgment or order directs the sale of 
mortgaged real property and the payment of 
any deficiency, the undertaking shall also pro-
vide for the payment of any deficiency. 
Amended Stats 1982 ch 517 § 156. Witkin 
Procedure (3d ed) Judgm § 82; Appeal §§ 187, 
188, 189, 191; Cal Jur 3d (Rev) Ejectment and 
Beginning in 1992, 
italict indicate changes or additions. • • • indicate omissions. 531 
§ 917.4 DEERING'S CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Related Remedies § 74; Cal Jur 3d Appellate 
Review §§ 197, 200, 202, 211 660, Limitation 
of Actions § 33, Mechanics1 Liens § 168, Sure-
tyship and Guaranty §§2, 83; Miller & Starr, 
Cal Real Estate 2d §§ 9:170, 18:151. 
§ 917.5. Appeal from judgment or order ap-
pointing receiver; Undertaking. The perfecting 
of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of the 
judgment or order m the trial court if the 
judgment or order appealed from appoints a 
receiver, unless an undertaking m a sum fixed 
by the trial court is given on condition that if 
the judgment or order is affirmed or the appeal 
is withdrawn, or dismissed, the appellant will 
pay all damages which the respondent may 
sustain by reason of the stay m the enforce-
ment of the judgment. Amended Stats 1982 ch 
517 § 157. Within Proceaure (3d ed) Writs 
§ 54; Appeal §§ 190, 191; Cal Jur 3d Appellate 
Review §§ 201, 202, Suretyship and Guaranty 
§2. 
§ 917.6. Appeal from judgment or order di-
recting performance of acts specified in 
§§ 917.1-917.5. The perfecting of an appeal 
shall not stay enforcement of the judgment or 
order m the trial court if the judgment or 
order appealed from directs the performance 
of two or more of the acts specified m Sections 
917.1 through 917.5, unless the appellant com-
plies with the requirements of each applicable 
section. Added Stats 1968 ch 385 § 2. CalJur 
3d Appellate Review §202, Suretyship and 
Guaranty § 2. 
§ 917.65. Undertaking to stay enforcement 
of order. The perfecting of an appeal shall not 
stay enforcement of a right to attach order 
unless an undertaking is given. The undertak-
ing shall be m the amount specified m the nght 
to attach order as the amount to be secured by 
the attachment. The undertaking shall be on 
condition that if the nght to attach order is 
not reversed and the plaintiff recovers judg-
ment m the action m which the nght to attach 
order was issued, the appellant shall pay the 
amount of the judgment, together with any 
mterest which may have accrued. The liabihty 
on the undertaking may be enforced if the 
judgment is not paid within 30 days after it 
becomes final If a surety on the undertaking 
pays the judgment, either with or without 
action, the surety is substituted to the nghts of 
the creditor and is entitled to control, enforce, 
and satisfy the judgment, m all respects as if 
the surety had recovered the judgment. Added 
Stats 1983 ch 155 § 22.5, effective June 30, 
1983, operative July 1, 1983. 
§ 917.7. (First of two; Operative until Janu-
ary 1, 1994) Appeal from judgment or order 
affecting custody or right of visitation of mi-
nor or exclusion from family dwelling; Provi-
sions regarding removal of minor from State. 
The perfecting of an appeal shall not stay 
proceedings as to those provisions of a judg-
ment or order which award, change, or other-
wise affect the custody, including the nght of 
visitation, of a minor child m any civil action, 
in an action filed under the Juvenile Court 
Law, or ina special proceedmg, or the provi-
sions of a judgment or order for the temporary 
exclusion of a party from the family dwelling 
or the dwelling of the other party, as provided 
in Section 4359 of the Civil Code. However, 
the tnal court may m its discretion stay exe-
cution of such provisions pending review on 
appeal or for such other penod or penods as 
to it may appear appropnate. Further, m the 
absence of a wnt or order of a reviewing court 
providing otherwise, the provisions of the 
judgment or order allowing, or eliminating 
restrictions against, removal of the minor 
child from the state are stayed by operation of 
law for a penod of 30 days from the entry of 
the judgment or order and are subject to any 
further stays ordered by the tnal court, as 
herein provided. Amended Stats 1981 ch 714 
§70 Within Procedure (3d ed)l. Appeal 
§§177, 178, 180, 181; Witkin Summary (9th 
ed) Husband & Wife §§ 79, 140; Cal Jur 3d 
(Rev) Guardianship and Conservatorship 
§280: Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review §189, 
Suretyship and Guaranty § 2. 
§ 917.7. (Second of two; Operative January 
1, 1994) Appeal from judgment or order af-
fecting custody or right of visitation of minor 
or exclusion from family dwelling; Provisions 
regarding removal of minor from State. The 
perfecting of an appeal shall not stay proceed-
ings as to those provisions of ajudgment or 
order which award, change, or otherwise af-
fect the custody, including the nght of visita-
tion, of a minor child m any civil action, m an 
action filed under the Juvenile Court Law, or 
m a special proceedmg, or the provisions of a 
judgment or order for the temporary exclusion 
of a party from the family dwelling or the 
dwelling of the other party, as provided in the 
Family Code. However, the tnal court may in 
its discretion stay execution of such provisions 
pending review on appeal or for such other 
penod or penods as to it may appear appro-
pnate. Further, m the absence of a wnt or 
order of a reviewing court providing other-
wise, the provisions of the judgment or order 
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